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Refusing to Debate Wheaties Versus Milchreis':
Blondin v. Dubois and the Second Circuit's
Interpretation of the Hague Abduction
Convention's Grave Risk Exception
I. Introduction
"[He] made it perfectly clear that he would abduct the child if I
divorced him ... [h]is payback was to take the thing I love most,
which was my daughter."2
International child abductions have increased by fifty-seven
percent in recent years, and the abductor is usually not a stranger
but a parent, one who professes to love the child.3 In response to
this international problem, a community of nations convened
almost two decades ago to draft the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.4 Today forty-
seven countries have ratified, acceded to, or signed the Hague
' See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that, in
considering whether to order an abducted child returned from the United States to
Germany, the court in the "abducted-to country" is "not to debate the relevant virtues of
Batman and Max und Moritz, Wheaties and Milchreis"). Max und Moritz is the title of a
juvenile book written by Wilhelm Busch, a nineteenth-century German painter and poet.
See Gabriele Kahn, Wilhelm Busch (visited Feb. 7, 2000)
<http://www.rivertext.com/busch.shtml>. Milchreis is a type of German rice pudding.
See HARRAP'S CONCISE ENGLISH-GERMAN DICTIONARY 348 (Robin Sawers ed., 1990).
2 Timothy W. Maier, Kids Held Hostage, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, March 8, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 8673728 (quoting Maureen Dabbagh, whose husband kidnapped
her daughter to Syria in 1993).
3 See Vicky Allan, The Child is Mine, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Aug. 8, 1999, at
S19, available in 1999 WL 23212542.
4 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.
25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494
(1986) [hereinafter Hague Abduction Convention]. The United States enacted
legislation implementing the Hague Abduction Convention in The International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1988)) [hereinafter ICARA].
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Abduction Convention The United States enacted the Hague
Abduction Convention with the hopes of "[sparing] children the
detrimental emotional effects associated with transnational
parental kidnapping., 6 Since fifty percent of all marriages in the
United States alone end in divorce,7 this treaty attempts to address
an international crisis.
Nevertheless, while the Hague Abduction Convention is "a
good law, the problem is patchy implementation."8 Only fifty-two
percent of the child abductions involving U.S. citizens that were
reported to the U.S. State Department between May 1997 and
early March 1999 were resolved during that twenty-two month
period.9  Even when international child abduction cases are
resolved, the Hague Abduction Convention raises serious
questions about the propriety of returning these abducted children.
This Note will explore the facts and holding of Blondin v.
Dubois'o in Part H.I Part I1 will examine the background law, 2
5 See OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S ISSUES, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Party Countries and
Effective Dates with U.S. (visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://travel.state.gov/
hague_list.html>. Signatory nations include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Belize, Bosnia & Herzogovina, Burkino Faso, Canada, Chile, China (Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region only), Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark,
Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal (including
Macau), Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom (including Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands,
Isle of Man, and Montserrat), Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. See id.
6 Letter of Submittal from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, to President
Ronald Reagan (Oct. 4, 1985), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,495 (1986).
7 See Symposium, The Rise of the International Trust Roundtable Discussion, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779, 806 (1999).
8 Shailagh Murray, Money Talks; United Europe Is Still Split Over Divorce;
Diverse National Laws Can Make Breaking Up Pretty Hard To Do; Location, Location,
Location, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 14, 1999, at R5, available in 1999 WL-WSJE
18406627 (quoting Mary Banotti, an Irish delegate to the European Parliament and the
European Union's official mediator for transnational abductions).
I See Mary A. Ryan, Correspondence, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Apr. 19, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 8673805. Ms. Ryan is the Assistant Secretary for Consular
Affairs with the United States Department of State. See id.
10 Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999) (hereinafter Blondin I).
n See infra notes 15-90 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 91-203 and accompanying text.
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and Part IV will analyze the court's opinion. 3 Finally, this Note
concludes that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation
of the grave risk exception to the Hague Abduction Convention's
requirement that wrongfully removed children be returned to their
habitual residence is consistent with the purpose of the treaty and
with the majority of United States and foreign case law. 14
H. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Felix Blondin and Marthe Dubois met in 1990 while visiting
Guadaloupe. 5 After returning to France, the couple lived together
but did not marry.16 In 1991, Blondin began physically abusing
Dubois at approximately the same time their daughter Marie-Eline
was born. 7 Blondin occasionally struck Dubois while she was
holding Marie-Eline, thereby hitting the child. Blondin allegedly
once wrapped electrical cord around the child's neck and
threatened to kill both Dubois and his daughter.' 9 Dubois and
Marie-Eline fled to homes for battered women for periods totaling
approximately nine months, returning to live with Blondin
intermittently.20
In 1993, Blondin sought custody of Marie-Eline in a French
court, but the case was resolved when the couple reconciled and
agreed to live together with their daughter at Blondin's residence.21
Dubois became pregnant again during the couple's reconciliation.22
Meanwhile, Blondin continued to batter Dubois, causing her to
13 See infra notes 204-41 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
15 See Blondin v. Dubois, 19 F. Supp.2d 123, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (hereinafter
Blondin 1).
16 See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 242.
17 See id. at 242-43.
11 See id. at 243.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id. The court's order stated that "'the parental rights over the child will be
exercised in common by both parents' and that 'the child will have its usual residence at
the fathers."' Id.
22 See Blondin 1, 19 F. Supp.2d at 125.
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seek medical treatment in March and June of 1995.23 The beatings
continued-after a son, Francois, was born in August 1995 and they
often occurred in the children's presence.24  Blondin also
threatened to "kill everyone" and to throw Francois out the
window. 25
In August 1997, Dubois left Blondin again and fled with the
children to the United States.26 Dubois did not obtain Blondin's
consent and forged his signature on documents needed to obtain
passports for the children.27 In the United States, Dubois and the
children lived with and were supported by Dubois' family in
Brooklyn, New York.2' Blondin, apparently unaware that Dubois
and the children had left France, soon obtained a French court
preliminary order that the children could not leave "the
metropolitan area without the previous authorization of the
father."
29
B. United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York
Blondin eventually discovered that the children were residing
in the United States and in June 1998, filed a petition seeking an
arrest warrant of the two children with the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.0 Judge Denny Chin
23 See id. In June, Dubois was treated for "a cutaneous excoriation near her right
eye, hematomas on the left arm and forearm, and hematomas on both breasts." Id. In




26 See Blondin 11, 189 F.3d at 243.
27 See id.
28 See Blondin , 19 F. Supp.2d at 125.
29 Blondin 11, 189 F.3d at 243.
30 See Blondin I, 19 F. Supp.2d at 126. Blondin asked the court to take the children
into custody until the court ruled on Blondin's petition. See id. In the United States, a
petition may be filed either with the State Department or "in any court which has
jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place
where the child is located at the time the petition is filed." ICARA, supra note 4, 42
U.S.C. § 11603(b). However, "[a] decision under [the Hague Abduction Convention]
concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits
of any custody issue." Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 9, 1343 U.N.T.S at 101.
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denied the petition but issued an order to show cause." The court
served Dubois with its order, appointed her.counsel, and five days
later, held an evidentiary hearing on Blondin's request to have the
children returned to France under the Hague Abduction
Convention.32
The district court found that Marie-Eline had adjusted well to
living in the United States where she attended public school.33
Marie-Eline testified that she did not like living in France because
Blondin "used to scream, and once . . . he hit me up [sic] and
because he always hit me. If I don't say what he want me to say,
he hit me. 34 Marie-Eline also testified that she did not wish to
return to France because "I don't want my daddy to hit me" and
that she, her mother, and her brother came to the United States
because "my daddy was too-too trouble for us."35
The district court's opinion reviewed the rules of the Hague
Abduction Convention and its application to the facts before the
court.36 Judge Chin noted that the Hague Abduction Convention
seeks to protect children "from the harmful effects of their
wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to
ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence"
so that nation's courts can resolve the custody dispute.37 Dubois,
the defendant, conceded that Blondin satisfied his initial burden
under the Convention." Dubois asserted, however, that the
petition should be denied under Article 13b of the Hague
Abduction Convention which allows a court to refuse repatriation
if "there is a grave risk that [the child's] return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation."39 The question before the court,
31 See Blondin 1, 19 F. Supp.2d at 126.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 125.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 126-29.
37 Id. at 126 (citing Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, Preamble, T.I.A.S.
No. 11670, at 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98).
38 See id. For a discussion of the petitioner's burden of proof, see infra notes 112-
15 and accompanying text.
39 Id. Article 13b states that
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therefore, was whether Dubois established by clear and convincing
evidence that such a risk existed if Marie-Eline and Francois were
returned to France. 0
Courts must narrowly construe Article 13b's exception and
cannot adjudicate the merits of the underlying custody dispute nor
assess which parent should receive custody of the children.4' The
district court noted that the court's purpose was to determine
"whether returning the child would present a 'grave risk' of
physical or psychological harm or an intolerable situation." 42
However, the court added that this narrow inquiry is modified by
three additional considerations. First, the court must undertake
"'some evaluation of the people and circumstances awaiting [the]
child in the country of . . habitual residence.'''' Second, the
court must consider that, in drafting Article 13b, the signatories to
the Convention were of the view that:
the interest of the child in not being removed from [his or her]
habitual residence without sufficient guarantees of [his or her]
stability in the new environment [ ] gives way before the
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or
administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of
the child if the person, institution, or other body which opposes its return
establishes that there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child
to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation.
Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 13b, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 1343
U.N.T.S at 101.
40 See ICARA, supra note 4, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A). The Article 20
exception for returning children in violation of "the fundamental principles of the
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms"
must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Hague Abduction Convention,
supra note 4, art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 9, 1343 U.N.T.S at 101; ICARA, supra note
4, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A). The Article 12 exception for petitions not filed within
one year of the wrongful removal and Article 13a exception for petitioners not exercising
custody rights or who acquiesce to the removal must be satisfied by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, arts. 12-13, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 7-8, 1343 U.N.T.S at 100-01; ICARA, supra note 4, 42 U.S.C. §
11603(e)(2)(B).
41 See ICARA, supra note 4, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4); Hague Abduction
Convention, supra note 4, art. 19, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 9, 1343 U.N.T.S at 101; see
also Blondin 1, 189 F. Supp.2d at 127.
42 Blondin 1, 19 F. Supp.2d at 127 (citing ICARA, supra note 4, 42 U.S.C.A. §
11601(a)(4)).
43 Id. (citing Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1995)).
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primary interest of any person in not being exposed to physical
or psychological danger or being placed in an intolerable
situation."
Third, the court noted that the Hague Abduction Convention
allows a judicial authority to deny an application to return a child
if the child objects and that child's age and maturity indicate that
the child's opinion should be considered.45
The district court then found three reasons why Marie-Eline
and Francois would face a grave risk of physical or psychological
harm or otherwise be placed in an intolerable situation if they were
returned to France.46 First, Judge Chin found that the evidence of
Blondin's physical abuse of Dubois and the children was credible
while Blondin "was not telling the truth. Indeed his testimony was
incredible. ' 7 Second, the district court held that if the children
were returned to France for legal proceedings, Dubois and
Blondin's financial situations would force Dubois and the children
to reside with Blondin, resulting in a grave risk of psychological
harm or an intolerable situation.48  Finally, the court noted that,
while not dispositive, it was influenced by Marie-Eline's wish to
4 Id. (citing Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report to the Convention, 29). The
case surely intended to cite to Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in ACTS AND
DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 75 (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Convention on Private
Int'l Law ed., 1982) [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report]) available at HAGUE CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Explanatory Report on Convention #28 (last visited
Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.hcch.net/elconventions/exp128e.html>. The Hague
Conference on Private International Law recognizes the Perez-Vera report as the Hague
Abduction Convention's "official history and commentary." See 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503
(1986).
41 See Blondin 1, 19 F. Supp.2d at 127.
46 See id. at 127-29.
41 Id. at 128. The court found that Blondin was not truthful when he testified that
he did not know why Dubois left him and in his allegations that Dubois lied about being
beaten in order to qualify for placement in homes for battered women. See id. Judge
Chin also commented that Blondin's testimony varied since he first denied hitting his
daughter or his wife but later acknowledged that he may have .'given [Marie-Eline] a
slap on the behind"' and "that he may have slapped her 'just in the heat of a dispute."'
Id. Blondin also misrepresented to the district court the French court's proceedings,
indicating that the French court sided with Blondin after a contested hearing when the
custody award occurred after Blondin and Dubois reconciled. See id.
48 See id.
62520001
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remain in the United States because of her father's abuse. 49 The
court then concluded that, because of his history of abusing his
wife and children, Blondin's "rights under the Convention
therefore must give way to the 'primary interest' of the children
not to be exposed to 'physical or psychological danger' or the
'intolerable situation' that would surely exist if they are returned
to France."5
C. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Blondin appealed the district court's denial of his Hague
Abduction Convention petition and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held oral arguments on May 6,
1999."1 At the hearing, the court ordered supplemental briefing on
placement alternatives in France that would permit the children's
repatriation and guarantee their safety.5" In the interim, the court
of appeals inquired, via the United States Department of State,
about the possibility of the French government providing care for
the children for the duration of the French custody proceedings.
The reply indicated that the French government would arrange for
"the necessary care" if the children were returned and that the
government had begun to review the "procedural means" for
making the placement.
5 4
On August 17, 1999, after obtaining this information and the
parties' supplemental briefing, the Second Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, remanding the case to the district court
with instructions that the court "develop expeditiously a more
complete record and . . . fashion appropriate relief' that more
thoroughly considers placement alternatives in France.55 The
circuit court analyzed the district court's three rationales56 for
49 See id. at 129.
50 Id.
51 See Blondin I1, 189 F.3d at 242.
52 See id.
53 See id. The letter came from an official with the Office of Mutual Legal
Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters under the French Ministry of Justice. See
id. This department is designated as France's central authority for Hague Abduction
Convention purposes. See id.
54 Id.
15 See id at 249.
56 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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denying Blondin's petition for the return of his children and found
that the court improperly considered Marie-Eline's adjustment to
life and preference to remain in the United States. 7 But the circuit
court noted that the district court "placed little emphasis on these
two inapplicable considerations" and instead primarily considered
whether Blondin's application should be denied under the Article
1 3b exception because the children faced a grave risk of physical
or psychological harm if returned to France. 8
The circuit court found that "ample record evidence supported
the District Court's factual determination" that the children faced
physical abuse if returned to their father.59 But the circuit court
determined that the lower court failed to consider the application
of the Article 13b exception "while still honoring the important
treaty commitment to allow custodial determinations to be made-
if at all possible-by the court of the child's home country." 60 The
Second Circuit then clarified the test for determining whether a
respondent satisfies the Article 13b exception, noting that a court
must "take into account any ameliorative measures (by the parents
and by the authorities of the state having jurisdiction over the
question of custody) that can reduce whatever risk might
otherwise be associated with a child's repatriation., 6' The court
agreed that the children should not be returned to the father but
held the district court erred in not fully considering placing the
children in the temporary custody of a third party, including the
children's godmother.62
57 See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 247-48. The Hague Abduction Convention allows
the court to consider the child's wishes only after finding that the child "has obtained an
age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of [the child's]
views." Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8,
1343 U.N.T.S at 101. The district court did not make any findings about Marie-Eline's
maturity or age. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 247. The Hague Abduction Convention also
limits the application of the "well settled" exception to situations where the parent waits
for more than one year before filing a petition for the child's return. See Hague
Abduction Convention, supra note 4, at art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 7-8, 1343
U.N.T.S at 100. Blondin's petition was filed with the district court ten months after
Dubois took the children to the United States. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 247-48.
58 Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 248.
59 Id. at 247.
60 Id. at 248.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 249.
20001 627
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The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court with
the instruction to "not limit itself to the single alternative
placement initially suggested by Blondin" and "to make any
appropriate or necessary inquiries of the government of France"
and to request "the aid of the United States Department of State."63
The circuit court concluded, however, by noting that it did "not
disturb or modify the District Court's finding that returning [the
children] to Blondin's custody (either expressly or defacto) would
expose [the children] to a 'grave risk' of harm, within the meaning
of Article 13b."64 The court further noted that if the lower court
could not find any "reasonable means of repatriation that would
not effectively place the children in Blondin's immediate custody,
it should deny Blondin's petition under the Convention." 65
D. United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York
On remand, the district court again denied Blondin's petition.
6
At the direction of the Second Circuit, the court undertook
significant fact-finding, including obtaining information from the
French Ministry of Justice and the United States Department of
State, hearing testimony from a legal expert on French and
international law and an expert in pediatric psychiatry, and
interviewing the children.67
The district court held that Dubois satisfied the Article 13b
exception for three reasons. 68 First, the court found that returning
the children to France would cause them serious psychological
harm.69 The children still lived with Dubois and extended family
and they continued to flourish in this environment.70 The child
psychiatrist testified that "any return of the children to France
63 Id.
64 Id. at 250.
65 Id.
66 Blondin v. Dubois, 78 F.Supp.2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), appeal docketed, No. 00-
6066 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2000) (hereinafter Blondin III).
67 See id. at 287-88.
68 See id. at 294.
69 See id at 295. Dr. Albert Solnit, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Pediatrics and
Psychiatry and Senior Research Scientist at the Yale University Child Study Center
interviewed both children extensively at Dubois' request. See id.
70 See id. at 291.
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would 'almost certainly' trigger a post-traumatic stress disorder
'that would impair their physical, emotional, intellectual, and
social development,' leading to 'long-term or even permanent
harm to their physical and psychological development.' 1
Second, the court denied the petition because of "uncertainties
surrounding the custody proceedings" in France. Assurances by
the French government that it would provide the children and their
mother with housing, food, and other amenities throughout the
child custody proceedings failed to satisfy the district court.73 The
court was troubled by what the children would encounter in
France: changing housing arrangements, custody proceedings
lasting between one and three months, and "extreme uncertainty
about where they would live and who would take care of them.,
74
Blondin's ability to gain temporary custody of Marie-Ehne during
the French court proceedings also concerned the court.75
Third, the court reasoned that Marie-Eline had attained the
right under the Hague Abduction Convention to have her wishes
considered.76 Article 13 empowers a court to "refuse to order the
return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned
and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of [his or her] views." 7  The court
found that Marie-Eline wanted to remain in the United States
because she expressed fear about returning to France and to her
father.78
The district court also rejected several arguments advanced by
Blondin and the governments of the United States and France.79
First, the court disagreed with the assertion that repatriation of the
children would cause only adjustment problems.0 The court
71 Id. at 292.
72 Id. at 295.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 295-96.
75 See id at 296.
76 See id.
77 Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8,
1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
78 See Blondin 111, 78 F.Supp.2d at 296.
79 See id. at 296-99.
80 See id. at 297. "[TIhe trauma of uprooting the children from their stable home is
20001 629
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justified its position by distinguishing Marie-Eline and Francois'
situation from numerous cases where courts refused to block
repatriation petitions under Article 1 3b.8"
Next the court disagreed that its Article 1 3b interpretation was
too broad.82 The district court interpreted the Second Circuit's
instructions for remand as indicating "that it is leaning towards the
extremely narrow conception of the Article 1 3b exception set forth
by the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich v. Friedrich.'83  Judge Chin
rebuffed the Second Circuit's implication that the grave risk
exception required the satisfaction of a two-part test: that Blondin
seriously abused the children, and that "no other options existed
by which the children could be safely returned to France. '84 The
court found support in the United States State Department's
description of the "grave risk/intolerable situation" exception,
which includes when a parent removes a child to protect them
from continued sexual abuse.85 The court noted that this scenario
did not require that the "court in the abducted-from country [be]
incapable or unwilling to protect the child."86
The district court then held that the restrictive Friedrich
Article 13b interpretation was satisfied because "Blondin seriously
abused the children and . . . they would suffer severe
psychological harm from any return to France, no matter how
compounded and magnified by the fact that they will be returned to the country where
they were severely abused, physically and emotionally, by their father for an extended
period of time." Id.
81 See id. (citing Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding
no allegations of child abuse); Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995)
(separating child from primary caretaker insufficient alone to satisfy the Article 13b
exception); Freier v. Freier, 969 F.Supp. 436, 442 (E.D.Mich. 1996) (refusing to invoke
Article 13b exception in the absence of allegations of abuse); Slagenweit v. Slagenweit,
841 F.Supp. 264, 267 (N.D.Iowa 1993) (granting petition because child faced only
temporary adjustment problems upon repatriation)).
82 See Blondin III, 78 F.Supp.2d at 297.
83 Id. (citing 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Article 13b is satisfied only
when repatriation puts the child in imminent danger or returns a seriously abused or
neglected child to a country that cannot adequately protect the child pending judicial
proceedings)).
84 See id. at 298.
85 See id. (citing Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10510 (1986)).
86 Blondin III, 78 F.Supp.2d at 298.
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carefully managed by the French courts."" The court explained
that "[w]hat France [cannot] do... is protect [the children] from
the trauma of being separated from their home and family and
returned to a place where they were seriously abused, amidst the
uncertainties of court proceedings and being on public
assistance."8
Finally, the court rejected the French government's allegations
that it was interfering with a French custody dispute.
Correspondence from France's Ministry of Justice warned that it
might be forced to act "at the level of international mutual
assistance in criminal matters" should the district court's
interpretation of the Hague Abduction Convention not lead to a
satisfactory result. 9 Judge Chin rejected "these veiled threats" and
reiterated the court's adherence to the Hague Abduction
Convention."
1I. Background Law
A. Hague Abduction Convention
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction was adopted in 1980 "to protect children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal
or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt
return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure
protection for rights of access." 91  The Hague Abduction
Convention achieves these purposes "by returning the child to the
parent or custodian with whom the child was residing prior to the
abduction, regardless of the existence of a custody or visitation
decree obtained by the abducting parent., 92 The United States
signed the Hague Abduction Convention on December 23, 1981,9'
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 299.
9 Id.
91 Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, Preamble, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4,
1343 U.N.T.S at 98.
92 Stephanie Vullo, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction: Commencing A Proceeding In New York for the Return of A Child
Abducted From a Foreign Nation, 14 TOURO L. REv. 199, 201 (1997).
93 See Letter of Submittal, Oct. 4, 1985, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,496
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ratified the treaty on October 9, 1986,"4 and enacted the ICARA9'
legislation implementing the treaty on April 29, 1988.96
ICARA and the Hague Abduction Convention differ from two
federal statutes addressing parental kidnappings. The Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA)97  applies to
abductions within the United States and requires states to enforce
other domestic, but not foreign, court custody decrees. 9 The
International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993 (IPKA)9
complements ICARA by outlawing international parental
abductions from the United States, thereby allowing the United
States to seek extradition of kidnapping parents from nations with
which the United States has extradition treaties.' ° The Hague
Abduction Convention is the primary avenue for relief when
courts are confronted with international parental kidnappings
because both the PKPA and the IPKA are U.S., not international,
law and because the treaty is the "supreme Law of the Land."'0'
However, IPKA is useful when the Hague Abduction Convention
fails or does not apply when the child is abducted to a non-
signatory nation. '°2 The Hague Abduction Convention also differs
from the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),' °3
which allows courts to control the physical custody of the child
while the abducting parent seeks relief in the country of habitual
residence. ,04
(1986).
94 See INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS: A GUIDE TO APPLYING THE HAGUE
CONVENTION, WITH FORMS 16 (G. DeHart ed. 1989).
95 See ICARA, supra note 4.
96 See id
97 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1998).
98 See id. § 1738A(a).
99 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1998).
100 See Jacqueline D. Golub, The International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of
1993: The United States' Attempt to Get Our Children Back - How Is It Working?, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 797, 799 (1999).
101 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
102 See Golub, supra note 100, at 797.
103 See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT, 9 U.L.A. 261 (1999).The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the UCCJA in 1968 and
every state has adopted some version of this model legislation. See id. Table of
Jurisdictions & Historical Notes, 9 U.L.A. at 261-62.
104 See Fred Morganroth, The Hague Convention: Understanding and Handling
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The Hague Abduction Convention applies to children who
were habitual residents of signatory nations before their
abduction.' 5 Hague Abduction Convention petitions to recover
abducted children may be filed with the abducted-to signatory's
Central Authority or in their courts.0 6 Each signatory nation must
"designate a Central Authority to discharge the duties... imposed
by the Convention ....,"0' The United States designated the
Office of Children's Issues in the Bureau of Consular Affairs in
the Department of State its Central Authority. 11 The State
Department's role, however, is limited to providing assistance in
locating the child'°9 because the State Department cannot act "as
an agent or attorney or in any fiduciary capacity in legal
proceedings arising under the Convention" nor provide any
assistance for the costs associated with filing, contesting, and
enforcing a petition for a child's return."o While a petition may
also be filed with the Central Authority of the nation where the
child is a habitual resident, that Central Authority will only
provide assistance in locating the child and forward the petition to
Child Abduction and Retention Cases, 78 MICH. B. J. 28, 30 (1999).
"I See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5,
1343 U.N.T.S. at 99. Elian Gonzalez, a five-year old Cuban boy rescued at sea on
November 25, 1999, best exemplifies the lack of remedies for parents of children
abducted from non-signatory nations. See Sue Anne Pressley, Young Refugee at Center
of International Dispute; Father, Cuba Want Return of Boy Rescued At Sea, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A3. Gonzalez accompanied his mother and stepfather on their
attempt to illegally enter the United States from Cuba by boat. See id. The boat
capsized, killing ten passengers, but Elian was rescued after witnessing his mother drown
and spending two days at sea. See id. Elian's father in Cuba demanded the child's
return but Cuba has not ratified the Hague Abduction Convention. See Bus. WIRE,
Leading Family Law Organizations Praise Decisions Allowing Return of Elian Gonzalez
to Father, March 22, 2000. Organizations like the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers and the International Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, urged the United
States to nevertheless repatriate the child because, in ratifying the Hague Abduction
Convention, "the United States has clearly adopted the principles which should be
applied to all international child custody disputes." Id.
106 See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 8, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 6-
7, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100.
107 Id. art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99.
108 See ICARA, supra note 4, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11608(a)-(c); Exec. Order No. 12648,
53 Fed. Reg. 30637 (1988).
109 See Vullo, supra note 92, at 209.
110 International Child Abduction, 22 C.F.R. § 94.4 (1998).
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the nation to which the child was abducted.'
If a petitioner, in the alternative or simultaneously, applies to
the courts of the nation to which the child was abducted, that court
will conduct a very narrow inquiry."2 The petitioner must first
satisfy a two-part test to prove that the child's removal was
"wrongful."" 3  First, the petitioner must prove that the removal
was "in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an
institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law
of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention."" 4 Second, the petitioner must
establish that, at the time of removal or retention, "those rights
were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have
been so exercised but for the removal or retention."'' 5
If a court holds that the child's removal was wrongful, the
court must order the child returned unless one of four exceptions
exists." 6 The exceptions are: (1) if the person petitioning for the
children to be returned did not have custody rights or previously or
subsequently agreed to the removal or retention;"7 (2) if the child
would face grave risk of physical or psychological harm if
returned;" 8 (3) if the "fundamental principles of the requested
State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms" would not permit the child's return;" 9 or (4) if the
person seeking return commenced the proceeding more than one
year after the wrongful removal and the child is settled in the new
environment.20 The Hague Abduction Convention also empowers
"the judicial and administrative authorities [to] take into account
the information relating to the social background of the child"
I' See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, arts. 8-9, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 6-7, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100.
112 See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
"3 Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4-5,
1343 U.N.T.S. at 98-99.
14 Id.
115 Id.
116 See id. arts. 12, 13, 20, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8-9, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100-01.
"7 See id. art. 13a, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
118 See id art. 13b, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
19 Id. art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 9, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
120 See id. art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 7-8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100.
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when considering the existence of an exception under Article 13 .21
These exceptions, however, must be narrowly construed so as
not to undermine the purposes of the Hague Abduction
Convention. 22 The drafters of the Hague Abduction Convention
warned that "a systematic invocation of [the] exceptions,
substituting the forum chosen by the abductor for that of the
child's residence, would lead to the collapse of the whole structure
of the Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual
confidence which is its inspiration. ' ' 21 Much attention was paid at
the Hague Abduction Convention's drafting session to Article
13b's grave risk exception in particular and delegates defeated
numerous attempts to broaden the exception's language.124 The
Chairman of the Hague Abduction Convention's drafting
commission noted that the delegates were especially wary of using
a "best interests of child analysis" instead of the grave risk of harm
language because the treaty's purpose was to repatriate the child
so that the child's best interests could be determined in custody
proceedings in the child's habitual residence. 25  Despite these
efforts, however, the delegates' failure to define the phrases
"grave risk" and "intolerable situation" opened the door for courts
throughout the world to interpret Article 13b in various manners.'26
In the United States, guidance on interpreting the Hague
Abduction Convention, including Article 13b, can be found in the
United States Department of States' explanatory materials on the
Hague Abduction Convention.'27 In drafting Article 13b, the State
Department notes that the Convention's drafters indicated "that
'intolerable situation' is not intended to encompass return to a
home where money is in short supply, or where educational or
other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State"
121 Id. art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
122 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 44, 34.
123 Id.
124 See id. 27-34.
125 See A. E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 537, 553 (1981).
126 See Lara Cardin, Comment, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction As Applied to Non-Signatory Nations: Getting to Square
One, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 141, 150 (1997).
127 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10494-01, 10510 (1986).
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but rather where "a custodial parent sexually abuses the child."'128
The commentary adds, however, that "[i]f the other parent
removes or retains the child to safeguard it against further
victimization, and the abusive parent then petitions for the child's
return under the Convention, the court may deny the petition"
because such circumstances justify protecting the child from an
intolerable situation and a grave risk of harm.
129
B. United States Case Law
Although the United States ratified the Hague Abduction
Convention years ago, 30 surprisingly few American courts have
faced difficult interpretative questions under the Convention's
grave risk of harm exception in Article 13b. This section
summarizes the evolution of U.S. case law construing Article 13b,
which is the most litigated of the Hague Abduction Convention's
provisions. 131
In the years immediately after the United States ratified the
Hague Abduction Convention, courts unanimously rejected Article
13b claims after finding that parties asserting the affirmative
defense failed to satisfy their burden of proof. For example, in
Sheikh v. Cahill,132 a New York state court disagreed that returning
the abducted child to the mother in the United Kingdom would
place the child at a grave risk for physical or psychological harm
or other otherwise place the child "in an intolerable situation.'
133
The court stated that the Hague Abduction Convention allowed it
to consider the child's social background. 134 Then, the court
interviewed the nine-year old child in camera before holding that
the father failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that




130 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
131 See Eric S. Horstmeyer, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child
Abduction: An Analysis of Tahan and Viragh and Their Impact on Its Efficacy, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 125, 127 (1995).
132 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
133 Id. at 52 1.
134 See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art.13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
8, 1343 U.N.T.S at 101.
135 See Sheikh, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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Furthermore, in Renovales v. Roosa,'36 a Connecticut state court
ordered two children returned to their father in Spain, finding that
the testimony of expert psychologists produced by their mother as
well as the testimony of the attorney appointed to represent the
children did not satisfy the exception.3 7 While the Sheikh court
confined itself to the inquiry stated in the Hague Abduction
Convention, the Renovales court conducted a broader inquiry that
in practicality was an inquiry into the child's best interests.'
While each of these early cases rejected parties' assertion of
Article 13b, the courts' divergent methodologies foreshadowed the
difficult interpretative questions to come.139
In 1992, a New Jersey superior court decided Tahan v.
Duquette, 14 starting a new phase of interpretation of Article 13b.
In Tahan, the superior court heard the second appeal involving a
mother's attempt to force her former husband to return their child
to Canada.14' After remand, the lower court found that the child's
father did not satisfy the grave risk exception and the appellate
court affirmed. 42  The appellate court noted that courts in the
United States and other countries had not addressed the scope of
the grave risk exception but concluded that the inquiry involved
"more than a cursory evaluation of the home jurisdiction's civil
stability and the availability there of a tribunal to hear the custody
complaint.' ' 43  The court then expanded the to-date narrow
interpretation of the Hague Abduction Convention's authorization
that courts explore the abducted child's social background, noting
that this inquiry could include the "psychological make-ups,
136 No. FA 91 0392232 S., 1991 WL 204483 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991).
137 See id. at *3-5.
138 See id.; Sheikh, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
139 See also In re Marriage of Helen Ieroimakis, 831 P.2d 172, 194 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the testimony of psychologists proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the children faced a grave risk of psychological harm
or an intolerable situation if returned because of the separation from their mother); In re
David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) (noting that the
mother failed to produce any evidence that the children faced the situations detailed in
Article 13b's exception).
140 613 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
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ultimate determinations of parenting qualities, [and] the impact of
life experiences" in determining whether a grave risk exists if the
child is returned.' 44
Tahan's expansion of the Article 13b inquiry was adopted by
several courts, although none found that the facts before them
constituted a grave risk. In Currier v. Currier,145 the court
conducted the expanded Tahan inquiry but held that, despite the
respondent's allegations about the petitioner-mother's depression
and estrangement from her parents, this evidence did not raise
"any serious doubt about the safety, propriety, or nurturing
character of the German environment to which the children would
return.",146 Also in In re Coffield,147 an Ohio appellate court held
that, while Tahan expanded the court's ability to review the
conditions the abducted child would face upon repatriation, the
Tahan test would not consider the respondent's evidence of the
petitioner-mother's lifestyle and method of caring for the child
prior to the child's abduction.
41
The next evolutionary stage of Article 13b's grave risk of harm
test came when the first two United States courts of appeal
addressed the scope of Article 13b's language. In 1995, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-
Menley149 reversed a district court's refusal under Article 13b to
return a child abducted by his mother from Mexico. 50 Four
months earlier in Rydder v. Rydder, 5' the Eighth Circuit rejected a
mother's reliance on the Article 13b exception where the mother
merely cited numerous authorities stating that children separated
144 Id. While the court expanded the Article 13b inquiry, it held that in the case
before it the trial court was correct in refusing to allow (1) the father to introduce a
psychologist's testimony about the child's bonding with the father; (2) the father and his
present wife's testimony about the child's aspirations; and (3) the child's teacher to show
the effect of the court's decision on the child. See id. at 488. The court held that this
evidence was more appropriate for the custody hearing that would occur in Canada. See
id. at 489.
145 845 F.Supp. 916 (D.N.H. 1994).
146 Id. at 923.
147 644 N.E.2d 662 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
148 See id. at 665.
149 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995).
150 See id. at 375.
15 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995).
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from their primary caretaker were at a risk of psychological
harm.' The Eighth Circuit held that the mother had failed to
present the district court with "specific evidence of potential
harm.
153
In Nunez-Escudero the Eighth Circuit was presented with
evidence that, while more specific than that produced in Rydder,
still failed to satisfy the Article 13b exception. 54 The mother
offered an affidavit stating that she was verbally, physically, and
sexually abused by her husband, that her husband and father-in-
law would not let her leave the home in Mexico without one of
them, and that she was not allowed to nurse the baby nor purchase
a car safety seat for the baby.'55 The mother's affidavit also
detailed verbal abuse by the father-in-law and alleged that the
"father-in-law hit his youngest son with a wooden plunger."'
156
The district court refused to grant the father's petition because
of "the baby's age, the impact of separating the baby from his
mother, and the possibility that the baby could be institutionalized
during the pendency of the Mexican custody proceedings." '157 But
the circuit court noted that the district court's second factor, the
impact of separating mother and child, should not have been
considered in evaluating whether a grave risk of physical or
psychological harm existed upon repatriation. 158  The Eighth
Circuit then held that the construction of Article 1 3b meant that a
grave risk of physical or psychological harm must be as serious as
the second alternative, placing the child in an intolerable
situation. '9
One year after Nunez-Escudero, the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich
v. Friedrich'6° affirmed a district court's ruling granting a father's
Hague Abduction Convention petition to return his son to
152 See id. at 373.
153 Id.
154 See Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377.
155 See id. at 376.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 377.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Germany, the son's habitual residence. 61  After finding that the
mother wrongfully removed the son from Germany, the appellate
court agreed that the mother failed to prove that the child's return
should be prevented under Article 13b.162 The mother's evidence
consisted of her testimony about the son's adaptation to life in
Ohio and an expert psychologist's opinion that the child would
experience loss and anger that could lead to developmental or
emotional troubles if he was removed from his mother and
returned to Germany.
163
The Sixth Circuit, in what it called a "restrictive reading,"
stated that a grave risk of harm under Article 13b exists only
"when return of the child puts the child in imminent danger prior
to the resolution of the custody dispute-e.g., returning the child
to a zone of war, famine, or disease," or "in cases of serious abuse
or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court
in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be
incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection."'"
The court justified its narrow interpretation by noting that this
exception "is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to
speculate on where the child would be happiest" because the
country of habitual residence decides that issue when resolving the
ultimate custody issues between the parties.1
65
The court then rejected the mother's evidence as unsatisfactory
to meet the Convention's clear and convincing evidence standard
of proof, noting that the mother simply alleged that her son would
experience adjustment problems. 66 The court added that it would
even be irrelevant "if the home of Mr. Friedrich were a grim place
to raise a child in comparison to the pretty, peaceful streets of' the
mother's hometown because the courts of the abducted-to country
do not have jurisdiction to decide where the child will be
happiest. 67 Testimony by the mother and the expert psychologist,
while not irrelevant per se, would be admissible under Friedrich
161 See id. at 1063.
162 See id. at 1069.
163 See id. at 1067.
164 Id. at 1069.
165 Id. at 1068.
166 See id. at 1067.
167 Id. at 1068.
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only if they shed light on the existence of one of the two situations
that constitute grave harm. 68
Numerous courts have considered Friedrich's restrictive
analysis when interpreting Article 13b. 69  Most courts have
refused to find that Article 13b was satisfied under the Friedrich
test, despite the allegations of serious abuse committed by those
petitioning for relief under the Hague Abduction Convention.7
For example, in Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis,"7' the respondent-
mother testified about abuse committed by the petitioner-father,
including pushing both the mother and the child to the ground and
causing the mother to be hospitalized with severe neck injuries
after violently pulling her hair.'7 2 In Steffen F. v. Severina P.,' the
only case denying a Hague Abduction Convention repatriation
petition using the Friedrich test, the court held that the mother
established with clear and convincing evidence that the child
should not be returned because of compelling evidence that the
abducted child's sister had been sexually abused.
7 4
Several other courts articulate different interpretations of
Article 13b, either because these courts considered the issue before
the Friedrich decision or because of the court's different
168 See id. at 1069.
169 See, e.g., Freier v. Freier, 969 F.Supp. 436 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Janakakis-Kostun
v. Janakakis, 1999 WL 153369 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); Wipranik v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Ciotolo v. Fiocca, 684 N.E.2d
763 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1997); Caro v. Sher, 687 A.2d 354 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).
170 See Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F.Supp. 922, 926-27 (D. Ariz. 1997);
Janakakis-Kostun, 1999 WL 153369, at *6. The Friedrich test, however, allowed other
courts to easily dispose of less severe or less convincing allegations of abuse. See
Freier, 969 F.Supp. at 442-43 (holding that children's adjustment problems and desire to
be near their extended family would not prevent return to Israel under Article 13b);
Wipranik, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d at 740 (affirming lower court ruling that father's occasional
use of marijuana and raising his voice did not constitute a grave risk); Caro, 687 A.2d at
357 (stating that respondent-mother alleged that the child would be unable to obtain
needed therapy or medication in Spain); Ciotolo, 684 N.E.2d at 769 (holding that wife's
allegations of domestic abuse were sufficiently countered by lack of police or medical
documentation of the alleged abuse and the Spanish social service agency's report that
no risk of danger was presented by the family situation in Spain).
'7' 1999 WL 153369 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
172 See id. at *6.
173 966 F. Supp. 922 (D. Ariz. 1997).
174 See id. at 931.
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interpretation of Article 13b. In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,"' a
district court cited Friedrich favorably but then held that the
abducting parent satisfied the grave risk exception because of the
petitioner's repeated violent physical assaults on the couple's
thirteen year-old son.'76 The court did not quote Friedrich's two
exceptions but rather supported its holding as an appropriate
extension of the hypothetical given by the United States
Department of State, 77 noting that "the Court sees no reason to
conclude that being physically abused with the frequency and
severity as that experienced by [the child] is any more tolerable."''
Several other courts have simply denied the respondent's
invocation of Article 13b without reciting the appropriate test
because the courts found that the evidence submitted failed in all
respects to establish the grave risk of harm exception by clear and
convincing evidence. 179
Several courts also consider the ability of the petitioner to
improve the situation for the abducting parent and the children
upon their return to the country of habitual residence. 80 For
example, in Panazatou v. Pantazatos,"'8 the state court entered an
"1 33 F. Supp.2d 456 (D. Md. 1999).
176 See id. at 462. The record stated that the father beat the son on the legs, back,
and buttocks, kicked him in back, hit him with fists, and called him derogatory names
over a six-year period. See id. at 459-60. The father also hit his wife, choked her, and
once pushed her down the stairs when she was pregnant. See id.
177 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
178 Rodriguez, 33 F.Supp.2d at 462.
"7 See In re Prevot, 855 F.Supp. 915 (W.D. Tenn. 1994), rev'd on other grounds,
59 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that psychologist's testimony of grave risk of harm
did not satisfy burden of proof where psychologist obtained most of his information from
the mother); Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F.Supp. 264 (N.D. Iowa 1993), dismissed, 43
F.3d 1476 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that Article 13b's exception was not established by
clear and convincing evidence where the child will receive adequate medical and
developmental care in Germany).
180 See, e.g., Harkness v. Harkness, 577 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding the circuit court's finding that respondent did not satisfy burden of proof
even though it disagreed with some of petitioner's methods of disciplining the child);
Harliwich v. Harliwich, No. FA 9868306S, 1998 WL 867328, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1998) (holding that respondent failed to allege even substantial evidence that the
child faced a grave risk of harm upon its return to New Zealand); Panazatou v.
Pantazatos, No. FA 960713571S, 1997 WL 614519, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24,
1997).
1 1997 WL 614519, at *1.
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interim decision holding that the respondent had established the
grave risk exception by clear and convincing evidence but noted
that the risk would be minimized if the respondent-mother had a
home and financial support and would not be imprisoned before
the judicial consideration of custody. 18 2 The court then obtained
guarantees from the respondent that he would provide housing and
financial support for the mother and his child upon their return.'
In addition, in In re Walsh' the court rejected the invocation
of Article 13b but secured the petitioner-father's pledge to provide
transportation and an escort for the children during their return to
Ireland, to provide for their housing and medical needs there, and
to act as a parental figure to them. 5 The father also pledged to
inform the court of how the Irish social services agency would
provide for the children in the event that he could no longer do
186
SO.
C. Case Law from Other Convention Signatories
Case law from other Hague Abduction Convention signatory
nations generally utilizes a restrictive interpretation of Article
13b's grave risk of harm exception but not to the extent expressed
by the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich. Other nations appear to rely on
two cases in particular when examining Article 13b's grave risk of
harm affirinative defense.
In the first oft-cited case, In re A,'l 7 the English Court of
Appeal affirmed a lower court ruling ordering a child to be
returned to Canada under the Hague Abduction Convention. 88 In
response to the mother's invocation of Article 13b, the lower court
reviewed evidence from psychologists and the child's principal,
but stated that the Hague Abduction Convention required a risk
that is "more than an ordinary risk .... It is recognized that such
psychological harm [as indicated by the mother's evidence] may
182 See id. at *3.
183 See id.
'1 31 F.Supp.2d 200 (D. Mass. 1998).
185 See id. at 207.
186 See id.
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be expected from the implementation of an order which involves
taking a child away from one parent and passing him to another,
and that the grave risk of psychological harm means something
,,189
more ....
The court of appeal agreed that the risk "must be one of
substantial, and not trivial, psychological harm" and that courts are
entitled to consider "the practical consequences of an order" to
return an abducted child.'9° The appellate court then held that,
while the mother now refused to accompany the child upon his
return to Canada in order to minimize the child's psychological
harm, the mother's "obstacles . . . do not extend beyond the
innumerable financial and practical difficulties" inherent in such a
return.' 9' The court then held that it was "the parental duty of the
mother to go with [the child] to Canada and thus minimize so far
as is possible the further instabilities which are likely to beset"
him.'92  This decision established a fairly restrictive test for
abducting parents seeking to avoid returning children under the
Hague Abduction Convention-a standard rarely satisfied in
English courts.'93
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its opinion in
Thomson v. Thomson" and for the first time defined Canada's
parameters of Article 13b's exception. Two lower courts had
granted the petitioner-father's Hague Abduction Convention
petition to return the child to Scotland before the Supreme Court
affirmed.'95 The respondent-mother argued that the two-year old
would suffer a grave risk of harm if separated from her.' 96 The
189 Id.
'90 Id. Before the lower court, the mother agreed to return with the child to Canada,
but on appeal she cited numerous obstacles that prevented her from doing so. See id.
The court of appeal, therefore, had to decide whether the psychological harm of the child
returning alone satisfied Article 13b. See id.
191 Id. at 11.
192 Id. at 11-12.
193 See infra note 171. But see Re M [1998] 1 F.C.R. 488 (Eng. C.A.) (denying a
Hague Abduction Convention petition where children had been abducted from Greece to
England several times, thereby establishing an extensive record of the psychological
traumas they sustained over a period of time).
194 [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 253 (Can.).
'95 See id. at 255.
196 See id. at 285. While the mother could accompany the child back to Scotland,
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court first interpreted the treaty's text, holding that within the
structure of Article 13b, the grave risk faced by a child must be
harm that amounts to an intolerable situation.197 The court then
held that although the child would face some psychological harm
upon his return and eventual separation from his mother, it did not
rise to the level required by Article 13b. This was especially true
in light of the father's pledges to allow the mother to retain
physical custody of the child pending review by a Scottish court
and to seek such review within five weeks of the child's return to
Scotland.'98
The judicial branches of several other Hague Abduction
Convention signatories have interpreted the grave risk exception to
the treaty to require physical or psychological harm that rises to
the level of creating an intolerable situation.199 Numerous courts
also have engaged in the bargaining between parents seen in
Thomson and have conducted broad inquiries to secure pledges of
support to enable the abducting parent to accompany the child on
its return to the country of habitual residence. 200 These cases
appear to be in response to the feeling that "[i]f the grave risk of
psychological harm to a child is to be inflicted by the conduct of
the parent who abducted him, then it would be relied upon by
every mother of a young child who removed him out of the
Scottish courts had already awarded the father custody. See id. at 287. Therefore, by
granting the father's Hague Abduction Convention petition, the court was in effect
removing the child from his primary caregiver of the last thirteen months and not simply
returning the child to Scotland. See id.
197 See id. at 286. The court asserted that the text includes the grave risk language
followed by the second clause pertaining to "or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation." Id. The court then interpreted the text as instructing judicial
bodies to find that a grave risk of physical or psychological harm exists only when that
risk rises to the level of an intolerable situation. See id.
198 See id. at 289.
199 See Gsponer v. Johnstone [1988] 12 Fam. L.R. 755 (Austl); Thomson v.
Thomson [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 253 (Can.); Re A (A Minor) [1988] 1 F.L.R. 365 (Eng.
C.A.).
200 See B. v. B. [1992] 3 W.L.R. 865 (Eng. C.A.) (discussing arrangements with
Canadian government to provide abducting parent with housing, air fare and welfare
benefits if she accompanied the child back to Canada); C. v. C. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 654
(Eng. C.A.) (noting father's agreement to provide support, accommodations, travel and
medical expenses for both the child and the child's mother upon their return to
Australia). '
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jurisdiction and refused to return. 2 0' Numerous other courts have
simply rejected invocation of the Article 13b exception where the
abducting parent's evidence did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence the existence of a grave risk of harm to the child upon
their return to their habitual residence.Y Several cases allowing
an abducting parent to defeat a repatriation petition using Article
13b's grave risk exception can best be described as anomalies as
these courts relied on facts that the majority of signatory nations
courts would likely find insufficient.
0 3
IV. Analysis
The Second Circuit's decision in Blondin II represents a
moderate interpretation of the Hague Abduction Convention's
Article 13b exception. This section analyzes the appellate court's
grave risk of harm test in light of the Hague Abduction
Convention's purposes and precedential case law, and discusses
201 C. v. C., 1 W.L.R. at 660. But see Re G [1995] 1 F.L.R. 64 (Eng.) (holding that
abducting parent satisfied grave risk exception where she refused to return with the child
to the country of habitual residence because the mother's psychiatric illness made it
likely that she would suffer psychotic episodes if forced to return).
202 See, e.g., Murray v. Family Services [1993] F.L.C. 92-416 (Austl.) (holding that
abducting parent did not satisfy Article 13b by alleging that New Zealand's courts could
not address her allegations of physical violence where New Zealand's family law system
paralleled Australia's system); Re C [1999] 2 F.L.R. 478 (Eng. C.A.) (reversing the
lower court's denial of Hague Abduction Convention because the lower court erred in
considering the welfare of the abducting parent and half-sibling instead of the child
named in the petition); Re K [19951 2 F.L.R. 550 (Eng. C.A.) (ordering child's return to
the United States because mother failed to produce any evidence that the child would be
subject to a grave risk of harm); Re L [1999] 1 F.L.R. 433 (Eng.) (holding that Article
13b's exception is not satisfied where the mother faces criminal charges for kidnapping
if she accompanies the child back to the United States); K. v. K [1998] 3 F.C.R. 207
(Eng.) (granting Hague Abduction Convention petition because abducting parent's fears
due to father's physical assaults of her are evidence of her risk of harm, not the
children's risk of harm); Re S [1992] 2 F.L.R. 1 (Eng.) (holding that abducting parent
cannot establish a grave risk of harm where she previously voluntarily returned the child
to the habitual residence before re-abducting the child)" ".
203 See, e.g., Re Ves [1996] 559SP (Ir.) (refusing to order an abducted child returned
to his habitual residence where mother alleged father sexually abused the child but
offered no evidence beyond her testimony); PF v. MF [1993] 1992 No. 390 (Ir.)
(denying Hague Abduction Convention petition because petitioner-father had a history of
irresponsibly handling the family's finances and would likely do so again to the
detriment of the child if the child was returned); MacMillan v. MacMillan [1988] 1989
S.L.T. 350 (Scot.) (denying petitioner-father's Hague Abduction Convention petition
because of father's history of depression and alcoholism).
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Blondin II given the serious international problem of domestic
violence. The section concludes by briefly comparing the Second
Circuit's opinion and the Blondin III decision.
While the purpose of the Hague Abduction Convention is to
protect children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal
from their habitual residence by ensuring their prompt return, the
treaty includes several exceptions.0 4 Some commentators argue
that the success of the Hague Abduction Convention depends on
courts limiting the scope of these exceptions.0 5  Other
commentators assert that Article 13b alone undermines the
Convention's goals by transforming judicial proceedings
considering the return of abducted children into duplicative
hearings on the merits of custody. 6
The Blondin II decision, however, illustrates how a court can
achieve the goal of repatriating abducted children while
simultaneously ensuring the children's safety.207  The Second
Circuit's opinion walks this thin line by focusing on whether the
abducted child faces a grave risk of harm if returned to his or her
habitual residence, not to the non-abducting parent.20 8 The Second
Circuit's ability to distinguish these separate issues is obvious by
that court's agreement with the district court's finding that the
children faced a grave risk of harm if returned to the custody of
Blondin.0 9 Where the appellate court found error was in the
district court's denial of the petition without establishing that
repatriation to France, the children's habitual residence, presented
a grave risk."0 The important difference lies in the fact that when
a court orders a child returned pursuant to the Hague Abduction
Convention, "the [child is] not by virtue of [the] order removed
from the care of one parent, or remanded to the custody of the
204 See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
205 See Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A
Brief Overview and Case Law Analysis, 28 FAM. L.Q. 9, 25 (1994).
206 See Glen Skoler, A Psychological Critique of International Child Custody and
Abduction Law, 32 FAM. L.Q. 557, 559 (1998).
207 See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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other. 21' The circuit court's instructions on contacting the French
government and the United States Department of State and the
circuit court's own communication with France's Central
Authority point to the appellate court's differentiation of these
inquiries.2 2  Therefore, the Second Circuit adhered to the
Convention's goal of safe repatriation of the abducted children
without devolving into the many issues more appropriately
considered in custody proceedings.
The Second Circuit's decision in Blondin II also supports the
spirit of the Hague Abduction Convention, which "depend[s] on
the institutions of the abducted-to state generally deferring to the
forum of the child's home state., 213 In instructing the lower court
to rely on any assurances from the French government about
providing arrangements that enable the children to be repatriated,
the appellate court noted that "we are required to place our trust in
the court of the home country to issue whatever orders may be
necessary to safeguard children who come before it. ' 214  The
Second Circuit's trust in the French courts at a glance appears to
be well-founded: in 1990 France became one of the first nations
to allow domestic violence advocacy agencies to become a civil
party in the criminal trial of a accused batterer.1 5
The efforts, and sometimes failures, of courts from signatory
nations to strike this delicate balance have created various tests for
analyzing Article 13b defenses."6 Some commentators assert that
U.S. courts are more likely to strictly interpret Article 13b's
exception for psychological harm than the judiciaries of other
signatory nations for two reasons. 217 First, United States appellate
courts ordinarily focus on issues of law instead of issues of fact,
making the Article 13b inquiry a novel exercise.1 8 Second, courts
211 In re Walsh, 31 F.Supp.2d 200,206 (D. Mass. 1998).
212 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
213 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 44, para. 34.
214 Blondin II, 189 F.3d 240, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Nunez-Escudero v.
Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995).
215 See CENTER FOR Soc. DEV. AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, Strategies for
Confronting Domestic Violence: A Resource Manual 41, U.N. Doc. ST/CSDHA/20
(1993).
216 See supra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.




of this country are more likely to believe that allegations of
psychological risk are more appropriately dealt with in custody
actions instead of treaty interpretations because of the decades of
false allegations of abuse in nasty custody battles.1 9
In Blondin II, the Second Circuit was faced with many issues
tackled by other courts considering Hague Abduction Convention
petitions, including how to assess the conditions the child would
face upon repatriation and the possibility of creating alternatives to
those conditions.22 ° While Blondin H did not expressly adopt the
Friedrich limitations on Article 13b,221 the court, in application,
adopted Friedrich's second example that a grave risk of harm
exists "in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary
emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual
residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to
give the child adequate protection. 222 For example, the Second
Circuit agreed with the district court's finding of serious abuse by
petitioner Blondin against respondent Dubois and their children.223
Both courts' review of the allegations of abuse and the family's
circumstances in France before the abduction mirrors the broad
inquiry into the family's environment endorsed in Tahan v. Tahan
and applied in Currier v. Currier and In re Coffield.224
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found the lower court's
opinion devoid of evidence that the French courts were unable to
protect the children in the interim.225 The district court's failure to
consider the second aspect of the Friedrich example explains the
circuit court's instructions that the lower court investigate the
possibility of the parents and French authorities taking "any
ameliorative measures ...that can reduce whatever risk might
otherwise be associated with a child's repatriation" and consider
the full panoply of arrangements that would allow the children's
repatriation.226
219 See id.
220 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
222 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
223 See Blondin M, 189 F.3d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1999).
224 See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
225 See Blondin 11, 189 F.3d at 249.
226 Id. Presumably the lack of findings concerning the ability of French courts to
20001 649
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The Blondin cases also represent a factual situation where the
petitioning parent is unable to make concessions that minimize the
risk of harm the abducted child will face upon repatriation.2 7
Numerous courts have declined to find the existence of a grave
risk of harm where the petitioning parent provided funds, housing,
air-fare and other means of assistance to enable the abducting
parent to accompany the child upon repatriation.2 8 However,
Blondin asserted that he was unable to provide any assistance to
the child or to Dubois because of his dire financial situation.29
The district court then refused to order the children repatriated
because it could find no other way to repatriate the children in the
mother's custody. 3° For this reason, the Second Circuit remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to explore the
possibility of third-party placement, either with some aspect of the
French government or an acquaintance of Blondin and Dubois. 3'
The Second Circuit's refusal to summarily deny Blondin's
petition in light of the history of abuse suffered by Dubois and the
children at the hands of Blondin may appear to some to highlight
the Hague Abduction Convention's failure to adequately address
the serious problem of domestic violence. In reality, the Hague
Abduction Convention hampers the judiciary of the abducted-to
nation from remedying the underlying problem where domestic
violence occurs.232 Courts are empowered to assess whether clear
protect the children between the time of repatriation and the determination of custody
would also have failed the tests articulated by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley and Rydder v. Rydder where the court held that Article
13b relies on the existence of specific evidence of potential harm. See supra notes 149-
59 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
228 See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
229 See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 247.
230 See Blondin 1, 19 F.Supp.2d 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Blondin had suggested to
the district court that the repatriated children temporarily resided with their godmother
while the French courts resolved the custody dispute between Blondin and Dubois. See
id.
231 See Blondin I1, 189 F.3d at 249. The appellate court held that the district court
had no basis in refusing to consider third-party temporary custody. See id. On remand,
Dubois may argue that separating the children from her, their primary caregiver, would
cause the children grave risk of harm, thereby raising a common but usually unsuccessful
argument for Article 13b.
232 See Regan Fordice Grilli, Comment, Domestic Violence: Is It Being Sanctioned
By the Hague Convention?, 4 Sw. L.J. & TRADE AMER. 71, 84 (1997). Grilli suggests
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and convincing evidence that a grave risk of psychological or
physical harm or an otherwise intolerable situation exists for the
abducted children, not the abducting parent.233 However, studies
show that children who witness domestic violence have
significantly higher rates of behavioral problems, difficulties with
learning, hearing, and speech, and are more likely themselves to
commit domestic violence in later years.3  The frustration this
engenders in some courts was evident in the opinion of In re the
Application of John Walsh when the federal district court noted
that the ruling that the children did not face a grave risk as defined
by Article 13b "does not in anyway diminish the deplorable
conditions of domestic abuse that this Court has identified, nor
should this decision be read to minimize the impact such violence
has on the lives of children.",
211
The district court's reasons for denying Blondin's Hague
Abduction Convention petition in Blondin III disregard and
contradict some of the Second Circuit's remand instructions.236
The Second Circuit did instruct that if the district court was
"unable to find any reasonable means of repatriation that would
not effectively place the children in Blondin's immediate custody,
it should deny" Blondin's petition.2 3' However, the district court,
perhaps due to its disagreement with the appeals court's narrow
interpretation of Article 13b, held that no form of repatriation
could prevent the children from experiencing grave psychological
that courts interpret the treaty to include a safe-harbor exception allowing courts in the
abducted-to nation to place children subjected to domestic violence in a safe
environment, either in the abducted-to or abducted-from nation, pending the custody
resolution in the child's habitual residence. See id. at 83.
233 See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 13b, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
8, 1243 U.N.T.S. at 101.
234 See Kathryn Conroy, DSW, Child Witness to Domestic Violence (visited
November 6, 1999) <http://www.columbia.edu/-rhm5/CHDWITDV.html>.
235 In re Application of John Walsh, 31 F.Supp.2d 200,208 (D.Mass. 1998).
236 See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit instructed
the lower court to explore placing the children with a third party in France to minimize
the risk of harm but the district court's opinion omits any reference to third-party
placements. See Blondin 11, 189 F.3d at 249. The appeals court also found it necessary to
"place our trust in the court of the home country" to act to protect repatriated children
during custody proceedings. Id. at 248-49. The district court, however, found
inadequate French government assurances for protecting the children upon their return to
France. See Blondin 111, 78 F.Supp.2d 283, 295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
237 See Blondin I 189 F.3d at 250.
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harm.238 The court based this holding on its examination of the
totality of circumstances affecting the children's psychological
health upon repatriation to France, including the effects of leaving
their new home, returning to the country where they were abused,
and facing the uncertainties of custody proceedings while living
on public assistance.239 In contrast, the Second Circuit's Article
13b analysis simply focused on how to prevent Blondin from
posing a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the
children upon their repatriation.240
Applying the district court's rationale, the Hague Abduction
Convention would rarely authorize the return of a seriously abused
child to the country where the abuse occurred, especially if the
family lacked financial resources, because of the risk of
psychological harm inherent such a situation. Blondin appealed
the district court's remand decision and the Second Circuit will
have the opportunity to further clarify its test for grave risk of




The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its decision in Blondin
II interpreted the grave risk exception to the Hague Abduction
Convention's requirement that wrongfully removed children be
returned to their habitual residence consistent with the purpose of
the treaty and with the majority of United States and foreign case
law.24 2 The court avoided the pitfalls to which other signatory
nations have fallen prey by clarifying that the Article 13b inquiry
focuses on whether the child faces a grave risk of harm upon
repatriation to its habitual residence 243 and instructing lower courts
to actively investigate the habitual residence nation's ability to
ensure the child's safety pending adjudication of custody rights.2"
Blondin II, therefore, serves as a model for courts faced with
238 See Blondin III, 78 F.Supp.2d at 298.
239 See id.
240 See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 250.
241 Blondin III, 78 F.Supp.2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), appeal docketed, No. 00-6066
(2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2000).
242 See supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
244 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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future Hague Abduction Convention claims involving the Article
13b defense.
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